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Abstract: This chapter explores the idea that the need to establish common knowledge 
is one feature that makes social cognition stand apart in important ways from 
cognition in general. We develop this idea on the background of the claim that social 
cognition is nothing but a type of causal inference. We focus on autism as our test-
case, and propose that a specific type of problem with common knowledge processing 
is implicated in challenges to social cognition in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). 
This problem has to do with the individual’s assessment of the reliability of messages 
that are passed between people as common knowledge emerges. The proposal is 
developed on the background of our own empirical studies and outlines different 
ways common knowledge might be comprised. We discuss what these issues may tell 
us about ASD, about the relation between social and non-social cognition, about 
social objects, and about the dynamics of social networks. 
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1. Introduction 
Social cognition concerns the representation of states of affairs in the world that, in a 
wide variety of ways, involve other people’s mental states and agency. It is tempting 
to try to understand the nature of social cognition by assuming that it is essentially 
different from non-social cognition, and, consequently, exploring and interpreting 
behavioural and neurological differences in the light of this assumption. One reason 
why this assumption is appealing is that creatures with social cognition, like us, seem 
so different from creatures without much recognisable social cognition. Another 
reason is that the perception of things like the intentions and beliefs of other people 
feels more intangible than, for instance, the perception of visual objects. A further 
reason is that some disorders, in particular ASD, seem to have specific differences in 
certain aspects of social cognition, suggesting that specialised, dissociable circuits in 
the brain take care of these functions. 
 
Here, we begin with a different assumption: namely, that though social cognition is no 
doubt in part processed in domain specific areas of the brain it is not essentially 
different from non-social cognition. To substantiate this approach, we will examine 
how both social and non-social cognition are instances of causal, perceptual inference. 
We then propose that what makes some cognition recognizable as social is related to 
the emergence of common knowledge, and explain ways in which underlying 
problems with cognition in general could lead to profound problems in common 
knowledge in particular. We explore the consequences of this approach for both our 
understanding of ASD and social cognition in general. 
 
ASD is an important testing ground for approaches to social cognition because this set 
of developmental disorders is first and foremost characterized by deficits and 
differences in social cognition. Individuals with ASD can be deeply socially disabled, 
with very severe language and communication deficits. Even when language is 
present there can be profound challenges in the ability to infer other people’s mental 
states. ASD is also characterized, however, by more subtle and difficult to describe 
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sensory and perceptual differences. In fact, it is an astounding characteristic of ASD 
that seemingly disparate social and non-social symptoms are found together. At times, 
these sensory differences present as islands of enhanced or superior performance, at 
other times, performance is diminished relative to the wider population. For example, 
on one hand individuals with ASD have been found to be less susceptible to some 
visual illusions than control groups, and on the other hand, they have been found to be 
less proficient in visual tasks involving the discrimination of coherence between 
perceptual elements (e.g., motion coherence; reviewed in Happé and Frith 2006). A 
key question is then whether and how these perceptual differences relate to the social 
deficits. One possibility is that these features of ASD are independent, another 
possibility is that the perceptual differences cause the social deficits, a third is that the 
social deficits cause the perceptual deficits (e.g., through problems with learning). A 
fourth possibility, which we pursue here, is that the perceptual differences and the 
social deficits in ASD are different effects of a common cause. We shall understand 
this common cause to be something afflicting causal inference, which is a process that 
manifests differently in the perceptual and social domains. The hope is, of course, that 
this approach will allow for a better understanding of this debilitating and heart-
breaking disorder. 
 
The plan of this chapter is to first, in Section 2, describe why social cognition is 
nothing but causal inference, and then, on the background of this commonality with 
the non-social perceptual domain, identify some notable characteristics of causal 
inference that occur when applied to the social domain. In Section 3 we then make the 
connection between social cognition, understood in this causal way, and common 
knowledge. Section 4 describes ways in which common knowledge can be challenged 
and compromised and how this would impact on social cognition. In Section 5, we 
explore how specific sensory differences hypothesised to occur in ASD could be 
continuous with compromised common knowledge, and how this may account for 
profound social deficits in this disorder. We exemplify this point with research 
performed in our own lab. The overall consequences for our conception of social 
cognition are then discussed in the final Section 6. 
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2. Social cognition as causal inference 
The paradigm of social cognition that we consider here is mentalising, the act of 
representing other people’s mental states. This faculty is invaluable for both 
predicting and understanding the behaviour of others. For example, if someone says, 
“the train leaves at three o’clock”, we represent them as having the belief that the train 
leaves at three o’clock. Similarly, if someone says, “It is very hot today, isn’t it? Do 
you know when the ice-cream shop opens”, we represent them as having the desire 
for an ice-cream. 
 
The representation that occurs in mentalising is entirely analogous to the 
representation that occurs in non-social contexts. For example, if you hear a particular 
rapid “tock-tock-tock” noise, then you may well represent the world as having a 
woodpecker nearby. Similarly, if you see smoke and hear a fire-engine, then you 
represent the world as having a fire nearby. In both mentalising and non-social 
representation of the world the process begins with some sensory input, which 
triggers an inference about what the causal origin of the input might be. 
 
Mostly this inference is unconscious, namely when it concerns perceptual states – this 
is the unconscious perceptual inference made famous by Ibn al-Haytham and 
Helmholtz, and defended by Neisser, Gregory and more recently in machine learning 
and computational neuroscience by Mumford, Dayan, Hinton, Friston and others 
(Helmholtz 1867; Neisser 1967; Gregory 1980; Mumford 1992; Dayan, Hinton et al. 
1995; Friston and Stephan 2007; al-Haytham ca. 1030; 1989). On occasion, such 
inference can of course also be conscious; for example, you could go through in your 
mind the various hypotheses about what may cause an individual’s statement about 
the hot weather and the ice-cream shop, or try to imagine different common causes for 
both the visual input of the smoke and the auditory input from the fire engine. It isn’t 
necessarily the case that the process of inference leading to mentalising is conscious, 
of course: a mental state attribution may pop into mind as automatically as a visual 
object does when we shift our gaze. In each case, the ease at which a new perception 
enters consciousness belies the non-trivial computational demand that an accurate 
causal inference from the sensory data requires. 
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If words, gestures, and additional behaviours that we pick up from other people are 
treated as just being characteristics of sensory input, and if the mental states of other 
people are treated as the causes of this input, then mentalising can be characterised as 
causal inference from sensory effects to worldly causes (Wolpert, Doya et al. 2003; 
Kilner, Friston et al. 2007). Mentalising is then nothing but the kind of causal 
inference that the brain is in any case consigned to engage in to make sense of the 
world. Of course, there are differences between social and non-social cognition, but 
viewed from the perspective of causal inference, we should not expect these 
differences to be more dramatic than the differences that exist between other kinds of 
cognition (for example, the difference between the processing of moving and 
stationary objects, or between 2D and 3D perception). In other words, the 
dissimilarities between these processes will only pertain to the kind of challenges in 
performing causal inference specific to a given class of worldly causes of sensory 
input. 
 
If there are specific difficulties in the application of causal inference to social 
phenomena, then we are likely to find that they stem from uncertainty in the sensory 
input. This is because what makes causal inference difficult is the lack of unequivocal 
one-one relations between cause and effect. Evidence for one-one relations is made 
uncertain by the presence of noise, ambiguity and non-linear interactions in general. 
For example, when we see smoke and hear fire engines, there is ambiguity regarding 
whether the cause of this sensory input could be a real fire, a pretend-fire in a movie 
set, or harmless smoke from a chimney co-occurring with a fire engine out on a false 
alarm.  
 
In order to engage in causal inference in spite of uncertainty, the brain can appeal to 
both the fit between the sensory input and the different hypotheses about its causes, 
and to prior beliefs about the probability of each hypothesis. For example, I might 
disregard the ‘movie set’ hypothesis because it is very unlikely that a movie would be 
set in my neighbourhood, and I might disregard the hypothesis that the smoke and the 
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fire engine are independent causes of my input because the smoke disappeared very 
soon after the fire engine sound ceased. 
 
All this is to say that we engage in Bayesian reasoning in order to infer the causes of 
our sensory input (Kersten, Mamassian et al. 2004). Such probabilistic inference is 
necessary precisely because the sensory input is riddled with ambiguity and 
uncertainty. The specific manner in which our brains engage in inference in a given 
context depends heavily on the place of the relevant worldly causes in the overall 
causal structure of the world. Some causes give rise to their effects in more highly 
non-linear, context-dependent ways than others and some causes are hidden deeper in 
the causal hierarchy than others (for example, the subprime mortgages that caused the 
global financial crisis are deeply hidden and there are numerous non-linearly working 
factors in the way they cause parts of our sensory input; in contrast, the redness of the 
apple in front of you is less deeply hidden, though it also depends on contextual 
factors such as lighting conditions). 
 
It is crucial to add an active element to our understanding of Bayesian perceptual 
inference, namely in the way we actively test our hypotheses about the causes in the 
world. For instance, we may engage in more vigorous visual and auditory search in 
order to figure out whether the smoke and the fire engine sound is correlated, or we 
may check the emergency services on the net to see if a fire is mentioned. Similarly, 
in the ice cream case, we may ask the person whether they feel like an ice cream. This 
active element is clearly recognized in key treatments of causal inference, where 
causation is conceptualized in terms of invariant relations under (active) intervention 
(Pearl 2000; Woodward 2003).  
 
Social cognition, we therefore propose, is nothing but causal, Bayesian inference from 
sensory input to mental states. To understand social cognition and how it may differ 
from other areas of cognition, the task is then to specify how uncertainty may arise in 
the inference from sensory input to mental causes.  
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Some sources of uncertainty in social causal inference spring quickly to mind. The 
mental states of other people are quintessentially hidden causes, so hidden in fact that 
their existence can be doubted on epistemological grounds, leading to skepticism 
about other minds. This is known as the other minds problem. John Stuart Mill 
famously proposed an inferential solution to this problem, via an argument from 
analogy with our own, known mental states (Mill 1865). Modern Bayesian accounts 
of social causal inference merely update Mill’s idea. The key observation is that 
mental causes are deeply hidden, that is, they must be inferred on the basis of various 
causal links, including observed behaviour. One problem here is that observed 
behaviour has a rather volatile relation to mental states. Different contexts will make 
it considerably more or less likely that a particular piece of behaviour is caused by a 
particular mental state. Famously, this occurs in deception, pretending, and stage-
acting, but the point generalizes such that a context can be found which makes any 
kind of mental state a cause of a certain behaviour (for example, we could assume you 
have rather bizarre beliefs about what aggressive ice cream shop owners do to force 
their products on consumers on hot days, and assume you fear such aggression, and 
therefore infer that your question about opening hours was motivated by a desire to be 
far away from ice-cream shops on hot days). 
 
It is thus tempting to say that social cognition is special in the sense of being 
dependent on the context of our existing knowledge regarding the other person’s more 
or less idiosyncratic sets of beliefs and desires. However, this does not seem to set 
social cognition especially apart from other types of cognition. Context-dependence is 
everywhere, and can entail many different degrees of difficulty. Already we have 
mentioned the example of subprime mortgages and the highly context dependent 
ways they cause other phenomena such as low interest rates and high unemployment. 
But everyday examples of perception are also highly context-dependent. For example, 
in the visual occlusion of a cat behind a fence there is a very intricate non-linear 
interaction between the context of the fence and the observer’s movements relative to 
the fence and the cat, which makes the unconscious perceptual inference of the 
presence of a cat non-trivial in this specific context. In inference under context-
dependence, it is crucial to rely on prior statistical expectations about what the cause 
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and the context might be, as well as on an ability to predict how the flow of sensory 
input will change under various interventions. For example, we expect the world to be 
populated by many more whole cats than by curiously aligned, detached cat slices, 
and we expect things like fences to be stationary in the world as we walk past, seeing 
the whole cat behind it. Similarly, we rely on statistical regularities about the likely 
beliefs and desires of people around us as we try to infer their mental states. For 
example, I rarely consider the possibility that you may have somewhat paranoid 
beliefs about ice cream shop owners. 
 
Hence, even though mentalising is riddled with context dependence, we should not 
expect this to be what sets it apart from non-social cognition. 
 
Another candidate for what makes mentalising special has to do with the number of 
sources of evidence causal inference can appeal to in social contexts. In many 
instances of perceptual inference, the same cause can be accessed through its different 
effects on different senses. For example, if you see smoke, you may also expect to 
smell it, and to feel heat. Similarly, different types of witnesses might be able to 
provide evidence about the existence of subprime mortgages (mortgagees, lenders, 
economists). Having multiple (conditionally independent) sources of evidence can be 
a very efficient way to minimise uncertainty about a causal inference. This kind of 
case should not be confused with the case where different instruments pick up the 
same piece of evidence; this can also be useful but speaks more to the reliability of 
the instrument than the reliability of the evidence. In the courtroom analogy, this 
corresponds to the difference between on the one hand relying on two lawyers to 
interrogate the same witness; and on the other hand having one lawyer interrogate two 
different witnesses. When trying to infer other people’s mental states we might of 
course rely on different senses (e.g., hearing words and seeing the mouth move) but 
this mostly seems to be akin to two lawyers interrogating the same one witness. This 
can be used to address uncertainty about the reliability of the senses, but not about the 
evidence itself. It is less clear how multiple, independent sources of evidence can be 
made available for the occurrence of a mental state. We can only assess mental states 
through the behaviour of other people, that is, mental states do not, in very clear ways, 
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give rise to other effects that we could access. This is why there is focus on 
developing reliable lie-detectors, although such instruments are of course 
controversial (and are, indeed, not allowed in most courtrooms). One might operate 
with distinctions within behavioural evidence itself, and claim that this constitutes 
different sources of evidence (as when we can see the mouth is smiling but the eyes 
are lying, or hear the person denying they are smoking but smell that they are). We 
think it is unclear how to treat such cases. Our point is that, even if these cases are 
allowed, there is still a distinction between the range of sources of evidence that can 
be brought to bear on mental causal inference, and the wider range that can be 
brought to bear on most of the everyday objects and events around us that we make 
everyday inferences about. 
 
We can call this aspect of social cognition evidential insulation: relatively few 
independent sources of evidence are available. Evidential insulation makes it 
particularly difficult to overcome doubts about the reliability of causal inference. This 
is thus an element that makes especially good sense once we understand social 
cognition as causal inference, which must proceed under conditions of uncertainty. 
Just as doubts about the reliability of a witness in court can be overcome by obtaining 
a second witness who gives the same testimony, we can overcome doubts about 
sensory evidence by obtaining further evidence from different sources. Without 
different sources it may be hard, or impossible, to gain sufficient confidence in one’s 
inference to justify further action. This aspect of social cognition may therefore 
exacerbate uncertainty associated with the context-dependent nature of mental states, 
and the especially indirect nature of the evidence that we use to infer their existence 
(compared to basic visual perception, for example). Evidential insulation is not 
exclusive to mentalising, since it occurs, for a variety of reasons, in many other types 
of causal inference. For example, when you hear a sound in the dark you may not 
have other sources of evidence available (you’re camping in the bush and the torch 
has run out of battery). However, we do think that it occurs systematically for 
mentalising and in this respect is a marker of social cognition.  
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The last contributor to uncertainty in social causal inference that we will consider is, 
in fact, specific to the social domain. In general, this factor has to do with the kind of 
uncertainty that stems from non-linear interactions between causes, and as such is of a 
piece with all other kinds of causal inference (for example, inferring the whole cat 
behind the fence). But in the social domain there is an intricate, special level of non-
linear interaction: when we interpret other people we are often aware that they are 
also interpreting us and that their behaviour depends in a non-linear way on which 
mental states they interpret us as harbouring. For example, when, on a hot day, the 
kids ask for the opening hours of the ice cream shop, you are interpreting their verbal 
behaviour under a model of the world that includes their model of your mental states; 
it is crucial for the further negotiations to understand that they ask this question under 
the hypothesis that you might allow them to get an ice cream – you could therefore lie 
and say the ice cream shop is closed all day. This aspect of mentalising we might call 
meta-mentalising. It is a fascinating concept because the interaction of mental causes 
is so pervasive: it can even be necessary to model how other people model you 
modeling them, and so on. This comes about because other people are agents: that is, 
their intervention in the causal chain is contingent upon their model of the world, and 
how they intervene impacts both on what you experience and how you model them.  
 
It is important to recognize that the need for meta-mentalising arises only because 
causal inference in general is challenged by non-linearly interacting causes. It is just 
that we happen to find ourselves in an environment with sensory input from worldly 
causes (i.e., other people) who can act, conditional on what our and their own mental 
states are. This does not mean mentalising is different from causal inference, but there 
does not seem to be any other area of causal inference where meta-modelling is 
required to overcome non-linearity. 
 
In this section, we have argued that social cognition, in particular in the shape of 
mentalising, is nothing but causal inference on hidden causes of sensory input. We 
pointed out that, as such, social cognition can only be set apart from other areas of 
cognition by the way causal inference is challenged by sources of uncertainty and 
ambiguity. This lead to the suggestion of two factors in particular, which each 
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contribute to uncertainty and ambiguity in social cognition. The first factor was 
systematic evidential insulation and the second factor was the need to engage in meta-
mentalising. 
 
This proposal goes somewhat against an assumption that lies behind much research 
on social cognition: namely, that there are domain specific elements in social 
cognition. The benefit of taking our approach is that the nature of social cognition, 
and the important challenges to social cognition in mental and developmental 
disorder, can be understood exclusively in terms of how causal inference occurs under 
uncertainty, which is a well-studied, standard problem-set in science. Because this 
approach makes social cognition continuous with all other areas of causal inference it 
holds potential for understanding how, for example, the social deficits in ASD are 
connected to the more poorly understood perceptual differences in this condition. In 
other words, social and non-social deficits may be different manifestations of an 
underlying issue with causal inference under uncertainty, where the apparent 
differences in these symptoms are driven by domain-specific factors creating different 
constellations of uncertainty. (Note that this is not to claim that there are no areas of 
the brain that are specifically engaged in mentalising, neuroscience evidence certainly 
suggests that there are such areas or modules; the claim is merely that such areas are 
engaged in causal inference too, just like areas engaged in other domains of 
perception; what makes it special are the constraints under which such inference 
proceeds, as we suggested above and continue to develop below). 
 
3. Common knowledge in social cognition 
Having argued that social cognition can be reduced to causal inference, we now 
proceed to characterise an important purpose of mentalising. Specifically, we focus on 
what people get out of representing mental states not just as simple causes in the 
world but as causes that themselves represent and meta-represent other people’s 
mental states including our own. This is an important concept to consider in 
identifying what people may get out of engaging in causal inference about other 
people’s mental states. With this focus on meta-representation we are able to speak 
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specifically to a factor that we argue makes social cognition a particular kind of 
causal inference. 
 
The idea we wish to pursue is that the main purpose of representing, and re-
representing, other people’s mental states, including their representation of our own 
mental states, is to enable common knowledge. Common knowledge is a technical 
notion, deriving from economics, semantics, and epistemology. We can introduce the 
idea with a famous example from one of the first treatments of this concept. 
When a man loses his wife in a department store without any prior understanding on 
where to meet if they get separated, the chances are good that they will find each 
other. It is likely that each will think of some obvious place to meet, so obvious that 
each will be sure that it is “obvious” to both of them. One does not simply predict 
where the other will go, since the other will go where he predicts the first to go, 
which is wherever the first predicts the second to predict the first to go, and so ad 
infinitum. Not “What would I do if I were she?” but “What would I do if I were she 
wondering what she would do if she were wondering what I would do if I were she 
… ?” (Schelling 1960: 54). 
Schelling is describing a coordination problem, where the married couple needs to 
coordinate such that they both go to the same place (although in this case it doesn’t 
matter exactly where that place is, just that they both get there). For this problem to be 
solved it is not enough to represent simply where that place might be but it is also 
necessary to represent the spouse’s knowledge of what the place might be, and the 
spouse’s knowledge of where the first spouse believes the meeting place is, and so on. 
The solution must involve, in Schelling’s terms, that they “must ‘mutually recognise’ 
some unique signal that coordinates their expectations of each other” (ibid.). 
 
This sets common knowledge apart from mere mutual knowledge. In mutual 
knowledge, people know the same thing: we may all know that the game will be 
shown in the park. But mutual knowledge can fall short of solving the coordination 
problem of deciding where to go tonight, because you may not know whether other 
people know that the game is on in the park, and this may matter to you because you 
don’t want to end up in the park alone, or at home while everyone else goes to the 
park. So you need to also know that others know that the game is on in the park. But 
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of course if you only know that others know that, then they might not go because they 
might not know that you and others know about the game in the park, or indeed that 
you know that they know that you know, and so on. In fact, to solve the coordination 
problem, an infinite hierarchy of knowledge about each others knowledge must be 
established. What establishes this hierarchy is not an actual infinite series of mental 
states in each person’s brain but Schelling’s unique signal that is mutually recognized. 
This signal can be very many different things. In the department store example it 
might be knowledge that the spouses would each find it amusing if they found each 
other in the wine store, in the park example it might be a particular tweet. 
 
In other cases it might be something as simple as eye contact. In a well-rehearsed 
example, two friends enter a full bus, but end up sitting at opposite ends of it. At a 
stop halfway through the ride a third person, also a friend, calls out from the street to 
ask whether the two on the bus would like to come for a drink. This initiates a 
coordination problem for the two friends on the bus: both want to get off the bus 
together to get the drink, and if not that then they both want to stay on the bus, 
foregoing the drink; but neither wants to leave the other behind. The key here is 
whether each of the two friends on the bus knows that the other heard the third 
friend’s invitation, and knows of each other that they heard this, and so on. This 
knowledge, and thus common knowledge, can be established if they both look up at 
the same time and their eyes meet, whereupon they are assured that the message was 
heard, and that they both know it, and know that they know it, and so on, and they 
therefore both alight the bus to get the drink. Thus, while the difficulty in consciously 
holding in mind multiple levels of the hierarchy of knowledge states required for 
common knowledge is an argument against the behavioural relevance of this concept, 
our brains may all the same be tuned to recognise cues that establish common 
knowledge efficiently. 
 
In general, a proposition P is common knowledge for S and S’ if and only if, S and S’ 
know that P, S knows that S’ knows that P, and knows that S’ knows that S knows 
that P, and so on; and similarly for S’. There is a very sizable literature on common 
knowledge, and different formalisations, interpretations and applications of it (for a 
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classic statement, apart from Schelling, see (Lewis 1969); for review see 
(Vanderschraaf and Sillari 2009)).  
 
We want to make the observation now that common knowledge manifests 
pervasively, and that insults to the ability to establish common knowledge will have 
profound and variegated effects on one’s communal function. Straight off, the kinds 
of cases where common knowledge is useful can seem rare and recherché. It does not 
seem central to the human endeavor to finesse with common knowledge our ability to 
find each other in department stores, to alleviate awkward situations when the waiter 
spills the soup, or to have a convention for who should call back (the caller or the 
called) when the connection goes (Lewis 1969). But of course common knowledge is 
everywhere, for social creatures like us who live in close quarters with each other and 
whose trajectories constantly cross. A good example is the convention to drive on the 
left (or the right as the case might be). We don’t just have mutual knowledge that 
driving is on the left, we have common knowledge: I would not go on the roads if I 
didn’t know that you know that driving is on the left, and you know that I know, and 
so on.  
 
Driving is an example where there are two equilibria, namely where we all drive on 
the left or all on the right. We don’t care which it is as long as we all do the same 
thing and we are confident that this is established as common knowledge. These cases 
are not rare but it is important to observe that there are cases as well where we do care 
which of several equilibria we end up deciding on. The stag hunt is one such case. In 
this classic example, two hunters can each hunt rabbit or stag. There are two 
equilibria, namely where we both hunt rabbit or we both hunt stag. Each hunter is not 
interested in the scenario where he or she goes stag hunting alone, because it is 
impossible to kill a stag without collaboration. Importantly, both hunters are more 
interested in sharing the stag than getting a rabbit each, because this way they 
individually get more to eat. Common knowledge helps with the navigation of this 
scenario because the hunters need to set up mutual expectations that they are going to 
do the same thing. Similarly, in the example with the two people on the bus, they both 
had a preference for getting off to get a drink, but only if they both get off. 
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So common knowledge plays a role in the great many endeavors where we jointly 
engage in some activity: particularly in situations where it matters that we do the 
same thing, that we together achieve an outcome that is optimal for each of us 
individually, and that we all know what others know, and so on. This even applies to 
simple, everyday matters such as cooking dinner. Even though the family members all 
know dinner is at seven, you will not be enthusiastic about cooking dinner for 
everyone unless you know that they know that dinner is at seven, and that they know 
you know that they know that dinner is at seven – if they don’t know this then they 
will not expect dinner to be at seven after all. Moreover, even though there are many 
solutions to the coordination problem of all being at the dinner table when dinner is 
served, members of the family will all prefer the final decision to be that dinner is at 
seven because that’s when they are hungry. Common knowledge is essential not only 
in cases where we need to establish awareness of a specific individual’s intentions, 
but also for the function of shared rules and interpretations. 
 
Michael Suk-Young Chwe (Chwe 1999; Chwe 2000; Chwe 2001) has developed a set 
of intriguing analyses of cases involving common knowledge. These analyses are 
important in part because they anchor common knowledge in a very wide set of social 
contexts. For example, Chwe analyses the decision to revolt in terms of common 
knowledge. He notes that people will have a threshold for when they will revolt, that 
is, they will revolt only if a certain number of other people also revolt. But of course it 
matters to your decision not only what your threshold is but also what other people’s 
thresholds are. You might be prepared to revolt if 2 others do so, but everyone else 
might only want to revolt if there is a million on the street already; if you know their 
thresholds then you know that your low threshold is pretty immaterial. There will also 
be cases where meta-mentalising is crucial. If three people communicate their 
thresholds of three to each other, and they know that this has been communicated, 
then they know that they occupy a world where the three of them have a desired 
equilibrium – and so they can each revolt.  
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If four people each have a threshold of three then we should expect revolt to occur – 
but this in fact depends on the shape of their social group, and whether this shape is 
itself common knowledge. If their communication is organized in a square then the 
revolt will not happen, because in this case common knowledge is not engendered. In 
a square, Person 1 communicates her threshold with 1 and 4 but not 3; similarly, 
Person 2 communicates with 1 and 3 but not 4, and so on. This means that Person 1 
cannot rule out that Person 3 has a threshold of five, and therefore she cannot rule out 
the possibility where Person 2 and 4 will not revolt, so she will not herself revolt. The 
key here is that the knowledge she misses is knowledge about what her neighbors 
know. Similar cases hold for all four people, so the revolution doesn’t happen because 
they each do not have knowledge of what other people know. 
 
If instead the group was organized as a kite, that is a triangle made up of Persons 1, 2, 
and 3, with person 4 dangling at the tail, then the revolt will happen, albeit with only 
three people. This is because now each of the three in the triangle know what each 
other’s threshold is and know that they each know this, and so on. The fourth person 
is unable to revolt due to an inability to establish common knowledge. 
 
Importantly, under this analysis the shape of the social network must itself be 
common knowledge such that the participants must know whether they are organized 
in a kite or a square. That is, they must know who communicates with whom and 
how. In other words, mentalising and meta-mentalising must proceeds under models 
of the wider social landscape, including models of whom the people you talk to talk 
to. 
 
Chwe discusses a number of interesting elements to this kind of analysis. One element 
is the distinction between strong and weak links that can exist between participants in 
a social network (Chwe 1999). Strong links differ from weak links in how probable it 
is that the friends of your friends are your friends too. If the probability of this is low, 
then the network is more a network of acquaintances than of close friends. When an 
individual passes a message in a network of strong links, they know that the 
likelihood of others in the network receiving the message, and the likelihood that 
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others know that the rest of the network has received the message, is increased due to 
the shared knowledge that the network is highly interconnected. Chwe’s analysis 
shows that strong links are good for ensuring participation (in revolt, etc.) when 
thresholds are low, because strong links ensure good communication in small groups. 
On the other hand, weak links are better for participation when thresholds are high, 
because information traverses weakly linked networks more quickly. Common 
knowledge scenarios therefore depend on an interaction between thresholds and weak 
vs. strong links; conversely, the shape of social networks can be expected to reflect 
the common knowledge scenarios they focus on (small, strongly linked scenarios 
might involve cases like when to make and come for dinner, and larger, weakly linked 
scenarios might involve cases like fashion trends or, indeed, revolution). 
 
A second element is the notion of bandwagons and their fragility (Chwe 1999). A 
bandwagon is, for example, a situation where Person 1 has a threshold of 1, so revolts, 
Person 2 has a threshold of 2, so revolts on knowing that Person 1 has a threshold of 
1, and Person 3 has a threshold of 3 so revolts on knowing about the thresholds of the 
first two, and so on and so forth for the rest of the people in the group. Bandwagons 
are very dependent on the thresholds and reciprocality of the first few links. If Person 
1 and 2 both have a threshold of 2, then nothing will happen across the whole group 
of people if communication is one-way only between Person 1 and Person 2. If 
communication is reciprocal in such a way that common knowledge is established, 
however, then the bandwagon can get going. Roughly put, this means that without 
reciprocality one will be less engaged in taking initiatives for social collaboration and 
will be left more to one’s own devices. 
 
A third element concerns the formation of cliques and the flow of information 
between cliques (Chwe 2000). For example, a leading clique might be a group of 
three people each with a threshold of three, organized in a triangle. This clique will 
revolt, and this will be known to a follower clique of two people each with threshold 
5, who will revolt, knowing about the leading clique. Notice that here the follower 
clique needs to model the shape and common knowledge properties of distinct groups, 
and at the same time model their own group in relation to this. That is, they need to 
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interpret their own local knowledge in a more global network of groups. Being too 
“myopically” focused on one’s own group means that the behaviour of leading 
cliques will be missed and one’s own group will fail to join the collaborative action. 
 
In addition to discussing these elements of common knowledge networks, Chwe 
(2001) offers many examples where common knowledge is crucial for the way groups 
are organized and interact. Common knowledge thus becomes a key element in the 
understanding of ritual, advertising, and the organization of public fora. Ritual 
dancing, for example, is interpreted as a tool for ensuring joint attention on the 
common knowledge signal, and easy detection of those who fail to attend. This 
ensures that the participants know that everyone got the message, and that they know 
that everyone knows that they got the message, and so on. 
 
There are methods other than ritual to ensure people’s attention to a common 
knowledge signal. In general, creating a signal with much redundancy helps because 
then it is more likely that many people will notice it and also notice that many people 
notice it, and so on. With this in mind, one can look at important events that initiate 
common knowledge based processes. The revolts of the Arab Spring, for example, 
purportedly began with the tragic self-immolation of the Tunisian street vendor and 
protester Mohamed Bouazizi. Though there may have been many protesters before 
him, the act of self-immolation is a signal that carries immense redundancy and as 
such many people would see it and see that many people see it. 
 
Interestingly, Chwe broadens the discussion of common knowledge to include objects 
too. That is, some objects exist in such a way that for most people they are 
represented in a manner that involves common knowledge. Chwe’s main example is 
the marketing of the mouthwash product Listerine. Listerine was originally an 
antiseptic, and few would consider putting it in the mouth. But through blanket 
marketing that focuses on the medically-sounding term ‘halitosis’ for bad breath, the 
makers of Listerine made it common knowledge both that halitosis was widespread 
and that your friends will not tell if you suffer from it. The thought is that you will be 
more inclined to buy Listerine if you know that other people are likely to have 
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halitosis, that they are likely to know about halitosis and its “treatment” through 
Listerine, that they are not likely to tell you about your halitosis, and that they know 
that you know about all this. Even though blanket marketing is in many ways 
characterized by redundancy, the redundancy helps create the common knowledge 
that sells the product. This means we can reasonably classify Listerine as a common 
knowledge object, or as a social object. Its representation is embedded in a functional 
role that involves what other people know, what other people know about what other 
people know, and so on. Chwe analyses Kotex, HIV tests, and Macintosh computers 
in a similar vein. Expanding the common knowledge conception to objects is 
important because it underscores the point that common knowledge is pervasive in 
our everyday lives. 
 
The picture so far is then that common knowledge is a pervasive element of social 
cognition, and that social cognition is to be understood as causal inference. We 
mentioned that meta-mentalising is an element of what makes social causal inference 
stand apart, and it is clear that meta-mentalising is a crucial part of common 
knowledge endeavors. We do not want to claim that meta-cognition is needed for all 
and only common knowledge, but it is tempting to think that they are closely related 
nevertheless. That is, in some instances it may be useful to model other’s mental 
models of one’s own mental model, even if common knowledge is not in the offing. 
This may be the case in deception, for instance. But even in these cases perhaps it is 
useful to model precisely to check whether or not common knowledge can be 
established. For example, it may be that you stand to gain more by not joining 
collaborative action: perhaps you know that your fellows are poor stag hunters so you 
will gain more by knowing that they will be off hunting the stag while you scoop up 
the rabbits. 
 
The proposal is then that the mentalising and meta-mentalising that comes with 
common knowledge processing is a pervasive and central part of the causal inference 
involved in social cognition. This includes all the different elements identified by 
Chwe, from the uptake of Listerine to the discerning of social network shapes like 
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kites and squares. With this proposal in mind, we next turn to the ways in which 
common knowledge formation can be challenged and disrupted. 
 
4. Challenges to common knowledge 
Common knowledge requires, in Schelling’s formulation, a unique signal that is 
mutually recognized such as to coordinate expectations.  We have seen that this signal 
may take many forms: eye contact, communication about thresholds, blanket 
advertising, self-immolation, etc. The context in which this signal is delivered 
matters. If delivered during ritual dancing, attention may be ensured, and if delivered 
through mass events (like the NFL Super Bowl) uptake can be ensured. Also, the 
context of social groupings, such as cliques, will matter for how signals are processed, 
as will issues like communication reciprocity in relation to thresholds for 
bandwagons. We have also seen that there is a varied class of events and objects to 
which common knowledge signaling is relevant. 
 
This means there is a rich tapestry of situations where common knowledge can be 
challenged and disrupted, where such situations will pertain to the processing of 
Schelling’s unique signals. 
 
A classic example of this is the Byzantine generals problem. Two generals, each 
situated on a separate hill, want to attack a city in the valley between them. They must 
attack together to succeed, or not attack at all, since a lone attack will be disastrous. 
The first general sends a messenger through the perilous valley with a message to 
attack at dawn but will of course only attack if receiving confirmation from the 
second general that he or she has received the first message. But the second general 
will not be happy to attack unless receiving a message confirming the first 
confirmation was well received. And so on. The consequence is that the attack never 
happens. The problem concerns the uncertainty about whether the messenger got 
through the enemy lines down in the valley. It would be solved if the signal could be 
made unmissable, for example, by agreeing to have a massive signal fire on each hill 
top – but in this scenario this would alert the city below too. This problem will arise 
whenever a signal isn’t known to carry perfect information. Of course the stakes are 
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not always as high as in the case of the generals, so often sending just a few messages 
will be deemed good enough. But the quality of the communication channel is a 
challenge to solving coordination problems. 
 
Notice that in this case, it is the reliability of the communication channel that matters 
– how well it carries information about the mental states of the sender. Across 
different kinds of cases, this would be a matter of degree. Some communication 
channels are more precise than others. This means the severity of the problem will 
differ from case to case. But similarly, the severity of the problem will depend on the 
participants’ expectations about the reliability of the communications channels. If a 
participant expects the communication channel to be very unreliable, then little trust is 
placed on the incoming message, and the urge bigger to enter a new round of 
messaging. This is a simple point that corresponds to the urge to sample for longer 
when one expects variability. Mismatches are then bound to occur when the 
communicators have different expectations for the precision of the signal. In 
particular, if one party believes the signal is as clear as a beacon on a hilltop but the 
other party thinks that it is as unreliable as a messenger sent through volatile territory, 
then we should expect common knowledge to suffer. 
 
The notion of expectations of precision is essential to causal inference. A given 
hypothesis about the cause of sensory input will have different strengths if the signal 
in one case can be trusted to be very reliable and in other cases not. Uncertainty in the 
signals we base our inferences on is state-dependent, that is, it may vary according to 
the context in which the signal occurs. This means that levels and regularities of 
uncertainty must be learned, and inform causal inference in the shape of expectations 
for uncertainty, or precision. This holds for all types of causal inference, including the 
kind that the Byzantines generals each engage in when trying to decipher the mental 
state of the other general from the context and the signals sent. 
 
The occurrence and robustness of common knowledge also depends on the degree of 
alignment between the participants. Alignment should here be understood as the 
degree to which different individuals share their initial beliefs about the world and the 
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present situation in particular, including the probabilities assigned to those beliefs. 
This matters because the more aligned participants are, and the surer they know this, 
the more they can be sure that a new message, when sent, will also be interpreted in 
the predicted way. Alignment is then a tool for reduction of uncertainty in message 
passing for the purposes of common knowledge. Perhaps we can add to Chwe’s 
account of the role of ritual here: not only is ritual used to ensure attention to the 
signal, it also serves to shape the prior expectations of the participants, such that there 
is less uncertainty about whether they interpreted the message in the right kind of 
way. 
 
This means that misalignment is a challenge to common knowledge. Knowledge 
regarding what other participants know (and what they know about others), on the 
basis of a unique signal, is undermined if we are not sure that the participants 
employed the right frame of reference to the signal. 
 
The list of challenges to common knowledge also extends to the notion of 
bandwagons. We noted that they are sensitive to the thresholds and reciprocality of 
the first few links. In particular, having reciprocal communication and common 
knowledge at the first links can do much to ensure that a bandwagon gets started. This 
requires a level of sophistication in the causal inference at play. For example, when 
Person 2 receives a message from Person 1 then it may be fruitful to engage in turn-
taking where a message is sent back. This requires inference of not only Person 1’s 
threshold but also of that person’s representation of Person 2’s threshold. If this level 
of representation is challenged, then bandwagons may get stuck. 
 
Finally, we make the general point that the causal inference required for common 
knowledge is context dependent and hierarchical. It is rare that signals are as 
unequivocal as beacons on the top of hills or self-immolations. Mostly signals are 
imbued with a degree of uncertainty and ambiguity. Confident inference then requires 
tools for reducing uncertainty and for resolving ambiguity. In order to do this the 
participant needs to appeal to prior knowledge and to active probing of the situation. 
That is, if you are not sure how to interpret a signal, then you can down-weight the 
Jakob Hohwy and Colin Palmer (forthcoming 2014).	   Social	   cognition	   as	   causal	   inference:	   implications	   for	  common	   knowledge	   and	   autism.	   Forthcoming in Social Objects, John Michael and Mattia Gallotti (eds.) 
Springer Verlag 2014. (Penultimate draft) 	  
	   23	  
character of the signal itself and instead begin to appeal to your prior conceptions 
about the situation and the likely way the message was meant. Of course, these prior 
conceptions will involve prior beliefs about the degree of alignment too. This process 
attempts to reduce uncertainty by taking the wider context into account, namely in the 
shape of longer term, learned regularities about what to expect. Similarly, a vague 
idea about what the best hypothesis might be can be tested actively, by predicting 
what the interlocutor would say in response to a particular question, were the 
hypothesis in fact correct (“if she said her threshold is three, then she will confirm she 
will revolt when I tell her that myself and my neighbor will revolt if she does”; this is 
neural hermeneutics, see (Wentzer and Frith forthcoming), or, more generally, a 
social version of active inference (Friston, Mattout et al. 2011). 
 
Notice that both of these tools for disambiguation of the signal depend on the 
expectations for the precision of the signal, which we mentioned before. If one 
expects much precision in the signal, then one will sample it for longer before 
appealing to prior conceptions and longer-term regularities; vice versa for the case 
where imprecision is expected. Similarly, if one expects much precision then one will 
sample for longer before resorting to actively testing a given hypothesis. 
 
For all these challenges to common knowledge, there is the prospect of interactions 
and cascading effects. For example, if there is a unilateral problem with trusting a 
signal, then common knowledge is not established and bandwagons may fail or 
misalignment result, which again results in more difficult common knowledge 
consumption. Similarly, if an individual is expecting more than normal precision in a 
situation loaded more than usually with uncertainty, then the distance between that 
person and others in terms of their ability to make sense of signals is going to be 
compounded. 
 
There is therefore ample scope for challenges and disruptions to common knowledge. 
We have presented this in terms that lend themselves to both the social deficits seen in 
ASD, and theories about which sensory deficits may be present in this disorder; we 
now turn to this issue. 
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5. Causal inference differences as a common cause of sensory differences and 
common knowledge differences.  
We first presented social cognition as a matter of causal inference, then we described 
common knowledge as a major ingredient in social cognition and outlined types of 
challenges to common knowledge. We now want to bring these elements together, 
using ASD as the key test-case. 
 
There is a very direct way to relate ASD and common knowledge: begin by positing 
mindblindness (i.e., a local deficit to a specialized mentalising circuit in the brain), 
then observe that common knowledge requires mentalising, and predict widespread 
difficulties with common knowledge processing in ASD. We believe this explanatory 
strategy is uninformative because it misses important aspects of the nature of both 
mentalising and ASD. If mentalising is just another type of causal inference, then 
mentalising deficits should be associated with a problem with causal inference; this 
direct strategy is blind to such issues. Similarly, this strategy ignores the presence of a 
wide class of non-social sensory differences in ASD, which are now so well-
recognised that the upcoming fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders will for the first time include sensory dysfunction as a diagnostic 
criterion for ASD (i.e., “hyper- or hypo-reactivity to sensory input or unusual interest 
in sensory aspects of environment,” Huerta, Bishop et al. 2012). It is hard to 
understand why there should be differences in very basic sensory processing if ASD 
is just a domain-specific deficit in mentalising (or indeed why a social deficit could 
cause a difference in the ability to perceive, for example, visual illusions). 
 
Above we advocated a common cause model of the sensory differences and social 
deficits in ASD such that the same underlying aspect of causal inference causes both. 
We believe this explanatory strategy is more promising. It has the potential to explain 
constellations of traits in the ASD spectrum in more detail than an account of a local 
mentalising deficit. It also has the potential to create a deeper understanding of the 
nature of mentalising and social cognition more broadly: we can present social 
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cognition as a type of cognition in general, rather than a somehow specialized 
module, and we can present social cognition as the upshot of causal inference. 
 
Notice that the explanatory strategy that we favour also differs from an approach that 
begins with the sensory differences and explains the social deficits as caused by them. 
On our account it is a deeper aspect of causal inference that underlies both. The 
challenge in adopting this strategy is to explain why the social deficits in ASD are so 
profound and the sensory differences comparatively more subtle. It is in order to 
discharge this explanatory burden that we appeal to the intricate causal inference 
involved in common knowledge processes. We think that there is a type of difference 
in causal inference that can explain both subtle sensory differences and profound 
social deficits.  
 
The underlying factor in causal inference that we will focus on is what we mentioned 
in the previous section, concerning the expectations for the precision of sensory input. 
This is a key ingredient in the idea that the brain processes its sensory input by 
minimizing prediction error (or more generally, free energy; Friston and Stephan 
2007; Feldman and Friston 2010; Friston 2010; Brown, Friston et al. 2011). It is of 
particular interest for mental illness and developmental disorders like ASD because 
differences in this factor have the potential to regulate the relative weighting in causal 
inference of top-down prior expectations and bottom-up sensory input. That is, when 
sensory precision is expected, top-down priors are weighted less relative to bottom-up 
signals, and when imprecision is expected they are weighted more. In general, having 
such a mechanism is crucial to causal inference because it ensures the reasonable 
principle that one should base one’s causal inference on reliable evidence, or retreat to 
priors when reliability drops off.  
 
This is then also related to people’s tendency to sample either more or less in sense 
perception, to shift attention, attend to detail, and to be sensitive to overall context – 
all aspects that are implicated in ASD. Expected precision, as we have mentioned, is 
related to learning of state-dependent levels of noise and uncertainty. This means that 
different levels of expected precision for different people can be expected to manifest 
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differently for different contexts, giving rise to the varied landscape of sensory 
differences and perhaps the heterogeneity of symptoms on the autism spectrum. 
 
The specific proposal is that as individuals get higher and higher on the autism 
spectrum, they tend to expect more and more precision in their sensory input (this 
proposal is worked out in some detail in Hohwy (2013 (forthcoming)). Heightened 
expectations for precision can be beneficial for some tasks because it is related to 
heightened attention and increased sampling. But similarly, it can be detrimental in 
other tasks, when the signal in fact is deteriorating, and when the context should be 
used to squash uncertainty. Because the concept of expected precision is very basic to 
all kinds of causal inference, and with a potential to cascade into many kinds of 
inference, it is conceivable that a domain-general trait bias in expectations for 
precision, that is very different from the majority, will present clinically. Thus, while 
for typical individuals the degree of precision expected from sensory input during 
causal inference should vary across contexts, here we suggest that expectations for 
precision are consistently high in ASD. 
 
From a statistical point of view, expectations for precisions are related to the 
confidence of causal inference. As such they are part of second-order statistics. This 
means that more drastic problems with optimizing one’s expected precisions can be 
very hard to rectify. It is basically a type of inference that is itself meant to ensure the 
reliability of first-order inference, so ensuring its own reliability requires going to a 
third level of statistics, and so on. This comes with metabolic costs and danger of 
regress that we don’t think the brain can comfortably encompass. This aspect of 
expected precision then speaks to the recalcitrance of mental, developmental disorder 
such as ASD (and schizophrenia, see (Hohwy 2013 (forthcoming)). 
 
This proposal finds a natural partner in the weak central coherence account of autistic 
perception (Frith 1989; Happé and Frith 2006), which suggests a processing style 
focused on local perceptual features and a diminished tendency to integrate perceptual 
features into a coherent whole. The idea that we suggest is that differences in 
expected precisions is the mechanism behind weak central coherence, and that it is 
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able to explain the varied landscape of enhanced and diminished ability in ASD, 
which the weak central coherence account cannot so easily accommodate. (The 
proposal is also related to ideas from (Mitchell and Ropar 2004), from (Qian and 
Lipkin 2011), and from (Brock 2012; Pellicano and Burr 2012; Friston, Lawson et al. 
2013). 
 
The proposal is new and evidence is needed to substantiate it. Our own research is 
providing data that is consistent with it, in the context of sensorimotor processing and 
multisensory integration. Our key model is the rubber hand illusion, which has all the 
required elements to trigger differences in expected precisions. The rubber hand 
illusion occurs when a visible rubber hand and one’s own hidden real hand are 
touched in synchrony, giving rise to the startling experience that the touch one can 
feel is located on the rubber hand (Botvinick and Cohen 1998). We assess the varying 
effects of this illusion on proprioception (perceived arm position), and also introduce 
a reach-to-grasp task after experiencing the illusion, which must then be performed 
under the uncertainty-inducing context of the rubber hand being experienced as the 
locus of touch. 
 
We find that patients with ASD differ from controls, and that individuals with ASD-
like traits differ from those low on ASD-like traits. Specifically, participants with 
ASD and ASD-like traits have more accurate proprioception, suggesting they do not 
integrate under a more global model, which would pull their proprioceptive estimate 
towards the (illuded) visuotactile estimate. This is consistent with an upregulation of 
bottom-up sensory estimates regarding arm position due to higher expectations for 
precision in sensory input compared to the control groups. Moreover, people low on 
ASD-like traits reach with much tentativeness and uncertainty after experiencing the 
illusion, which is not seen in individuals with high ASD-like traits, suggesting that the 
latter group expect more precision in the proprioceptive and kinestestic input they will 
receive as movement unfolds (Paton, Hohwy et al. 2011; Palmer, Paton et al. 2013). 
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This idea is also worth pursuing as the variability of findings for ASD in the sensory 
domain may be better explained by appealing to differences in the presence and 
absence of uncertainty-inducing contexts in specific experimental set-ups. 
 
The question we wish to address now is whether expectations for high precision of 
sensory input would cause the kinds of challenges we have outlined for common 
knowledge, and thereby on social cognition. 
 
It seems clear that someone with expectations for high precision will present 
differently in scenarios that invoke versions of the Byzantine generals problem. Under 
conditions of uncertainty (i.e., not a beacon on a hill but a more subtle signal), people 
with higher expectations for precision should trust the signal more and sample the 
signal for longer in order to arrive at the expected precise estimate. People who expect 
less sensory precision should be quicker to appeal to prior expectations (e.g., rely on 
known alignment) to overcome uncertainty, and should not sample for as long. This 
should manifest such that those expecting precision will sometimes act on a 
misinterpreted signal because they trust it more than the context mandates they should 
(compare: reach less tentatively and more smoothly), and might fail to a larger degree 
to integrate the signal under a model of (aligned) mental states of the sender; 
alternatively, they may sample for longer than neurotypical collaborators and thus not 
act when everyone else is acting – missing the boat and failing to learn common 
knowledge truths. 
 
At the outset we noted that social cognition is special because it involves meta-
cognition, that is, representation of others mental representation of one’s own and 
other’s mental states. This occurs not only in one’s attempt at representing other’s 
mental states but also in extracting information about the shape of social networks and 
who is telling what to whom (e.g., “is this a square or a kite?”). This was noted to be a 
special kind of non-linear, causal interaction, and was identified as a requirement for 
common knowledge. Non-linearity is what introduces ambiguity in causal inference 
because it makes it difficult to match cause and effect in one-one relations. Multiple, 
nested levels of non-linearity is then especially difficult to deal with and requires 
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especially well-honed balance of trusting the signal and relying on prior knowledge. 
In other words, we expect meta-mentalising to be especially challenged when 
expectations for precision are not optimized. Specifically, expecting too much 
precision means being more stuck in low-level signal processing and less inclined to 
fit represented causes in with more global models. This would predict that highly 
interacting causes are missed, in particular those that relate to meta-mentalising. 
 
This overall picture of lessened representation of high-level, interacting causes would 
then cascade to other areas. For example, if meta-mentalising is less prevalent, then 
there will be less inclination to offer information about one’s own threshold, which 
could feed into other’s model of oneself. This impedes the reciprocality that we saw 
was often needed to take initiative and get a bandwagon rolling. Likewise, we can 
expect such problems to cascade into lessened alignment, and reduced concern about 
being aligned with others. The result of these mechanisms is that not only does the 
person with expectations for high precision in sensory estimation fail to represent 
other’s mental states with much depth, they also will tend to fail to be able to learn, 
and they will be marginalized in common knowledge efforts. 
 
It thus seems to us that the quite simple proposal that individuals with ASD have 
problems with optimizing their expected precisions quite quickly can cause profound 
and widespread problems in common knowledge, with wide ramifications for social 
cognition at large. 
 
Compared to typically developing children, those with ASD tend to show 
developmental delays on tasks designed to test for the basic ability to attribute mental 
states (reviewed in Happé 1995). Many individuals with ASD, however, especially 
older children and adults, are able to pass the classic tests of this faculty, instead 
showing more subtle behavioural and neurophysiological differences in tasks that 
have been suggested to more specifically elicit automatic mental-state attribution, 
rather than allowing for inference via explicit reasoning or other strategies (Klin 
2000; Castelli, Frith et al. 2002; Senju, Southgate et al. 2009). It has thus been 
proposed that a deficit in the automatic and intuitive ability to attribute mental states 
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can be compensated for, just not to the extent that everyday social difficulties can be 
avoided (Happé 1995; Frith 2004). Understanding mentalising with respect to 
coordination problems and differences in expected precisions may therefore be useful 
in characterising the extent to which individuals can compensate, or fail to 
compensate, for deficits in automatic processes involved in mental state attribution. 
 
We also noted at the beginning that mentalising seems like a special kind of causal 
inference because it concerns a domain that is relatively evidentially insulated. This 
also relates to expected precisions. In a domain that is highly influenced by non-
linearly interacting causes it is crucial to have tools for compensating for uncertainty 
and ambiguity. One such tool is to recruit other, conditionally independent sources of 
evidence. This is, as we noted, seen in the courtroom analogy where a few additional 
witnesses can resolve uncertainty about a particular witness report. Without access to 
further witnesses the court must resolve to either increase sampling from the same, 
one witness (interrogating more), or rely more heavily upon prior conceptions (the 
witness is already known to be unreliable, for example). In the sensory, and social, 
case it is hard to see how conditionally independent sources of evidence could be 
recruited. Therefore the brain must resort to the latter two strategies, which of course 
both pertain to expected precision as we have explicated the notion above. Evidential 
insulation of mental states therefore compounds the problems that may arise for those 
with suboptimal expectations for precisions in the social areas where optimal 
expectations are most needed. 
 
We will end this section by noting how the proposed differences in expected 
precisions could dynamically impact on social interaction. This stems from the trivial 
observation that communication is a ‘two-way street’ where the quality and quantity 
of an individual’s participation depends on what the interlocutors offer up. On our 
proposal, we predict restricted messaging to individuals with ASD from other people. 
Common knowledge depends on everyone knowing what messages were received by 
whom and how they were interpreted. If interlocutors can see that some participant is 
consistently not paying attention (e.g., literally out of step in ritual dance; or engulfed 
in increased sensory sampling), then it may not be worth sending messages to that 
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person. Thus Schelling’s unique signal may become less and less available to 
individuals with ASD because the rest of us are less inclined to include them. At the 
same time, there may be restricted messaging from individuals with ASD to other 
people. If such an individual does not engage in much meta-mentalising and does not 
represent social networks and reciprocal communication channels correctly, then they 
will be less inclined to divulge information about their thresholds in the right way in 
the right circumstances, and then they will be gradually dealt out of common 
knowledge generation (treated as the tail of kites, or as one-person cliques). 
 
Once upon a time ASD was explained with the sexist and now entirely discredited 
cold mother hypothesis, namely that it was caused by emotionally cold mothering. 
With our proposal comes a different kind of social interaction model, where a simple 
deficit in expected precisions leads to a cold social network, where fewer messages 
are being communicated both ways, and where people with ASD are increasingly in 
danger of being marginalized. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
The agenda in this chapter has been to throw light on the notion of social cognition by 
aligning it with causal inference in general and common knowledge in particular. We 
have used ASD as a test case to bring out how basic, simple differences in the 
optimization of expectations of the precision of sensory input could challenge 
common knowledge and thereby social cognition in ASD. 
 
This differs from many other accounts of ASD because we do not think people with 
ASD have a specific inability to represent mental states of other people. The problem 
does not arise because those states of the world are mental. It arises instead because 
the causal inference required to extract these causes, from the sensory input one 
receives, is especially sensitive to exquisite optimization of expected precisions. This 
has to do with the requirement to meta-mentalise to engage in common knowledge 
exchanges and the fact that uncertainty in mentalising cannot be resolved easily by 
appeal to conditionally independent sources of evidence. 
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If this kind of challenge to causal inference in the social domain occurs early in 
developmental processes, then it is possible that a deep-seated and incorrigible deficit 
in mentalising ensues – a profound mindblindness that impedes language learning and 
many other social aspects of normal life. But in principle, people with ASD should be 
able to represent mental states, since they are just causes in the world, on a par with 
other, non-mental causes, which they are able to discern. One interesting possibility 
here is what happens if people with similar, skewed expectations for precisions 
communicate with each other (on internet forums, for example). We expect that 
mentalising will be more likely when people share expected precisions and also that it 
will be easier for common knowledge to arise because problems like the Byzantine 
generals problem, the bandwagon issues, and the cold social network issues we have 
discussed all to some degree depend on people having differences in such 
expectations and misaligned priors.  
 
Lastly, there is a clear program here for further, empirical study on two fronts. Firstly, 
one could study whether it is the case that people with ASD and high on ASD-like 
traits do expect more precision in their sensory input, how this plays out in sensory 
contexts under differing levels of uncertainty and how this may impact on social 
cognition. Secondly, one could study whether common knowledge is a main 
contributor to social cognition, and whether it is especially challenged in ASD, in the 
ways that we have outlined. Such empirical study could look at, for example, the 
relative uptake of common knowledge objects like Listerine and Macintosh 
computers; studies could focus on the relative participation in common knowledge 
activities such as revolts, and compare this with pure preference based activities; and 
studies could focus on participation and performance in collaborative games such as 
the stag hunt (see Yoshida, Dziobek et al. 2010). Finally, studies could investigate 
whether intra-autistic communication in fact has improved social cognition, 
mentalising and common knowledge, but perhaps with a different timbre, scope and 
depth than that seen in the general population. 
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